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When Contractual Good Faith Meets a
Controversial M&A Issue: The Sandbagging
Practice in International Arbitration
MAXIME PANHARD*

I.

Introduction

International Commercial Arbitration (ICA) is a forum where different
legal systems meet, merge, and create autonomous rules, mostly unwritten
and sometimes subjective. Given this autonomy, one interesting way to
study the ICA approach to certain issues is to start with comparative law and
add specificities of this system. The results give insights about what can be
expected in ICA, as well as an illustration of the specificities of this system.
This article analyzes a mergers and acquisitions (M&A) issue known as the
sandbagging practice. Sandbagging occurs when the buyer of a company
brings a claim against the seller after the deal has closed for a breach of
representation that the buyer knew about before the closing., This issue
occurs in civil and common law systems, but is approached with different
legal grounds, including the contractual good faith principle. Despite this,
ICA is the most used dispute resolution method with regard to transnational
M&A disputes, and implies a very specific role for the contractual good faith
principle.2 Given the different national system solutions to the contractual
good faith principle, it must be determined whether the frequent use of the
good faith principle by international arbitrators can also be used to solve
sandbagging practice cases in ICA.

&

* Maxime Panhard is a French lawyer specialized in international litigation, Ph.D candidate
at the Sorbonne University in Paris, and visiting researcher at Fordham University in New
York. He is member of the Paris Bar and of the Madrid Bar and teaches law at the Paris
Dauphine University. He practices law in Paris, Madrid, and New York.
1. See Charles K. Whitehead, Sandbagging: Default Rules and Acquisition Agreements, 36 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 1081, 1081 (2011).
2. See Beata Gessel-Kalinowska vel Kalisz, Representations and Warranties in Cross Border
Mergers and Acquisitions: The Challenges of Cultural Diversity, 24 ICC INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN 1, 32 (2013) ("The vast majority of disputes arising out of M&A
transactions are resolved outside State courts. Arbitration is favoured [sic] by parties looking for
expediency, confidentiality, a good understanding of business needs in M&A transactions on the
part of the tribunal, and a spirit of cooperation that at best could lead to a settlement and will
otherwise result in a fair and equitable award under applicable law."); Ronald L. Hicks, Jr.
Amanda R. Gerstnecker, Litigation Issues in Asset PurchaseAgreements, Ass'N OF CORP. COUNS.,
Dec. 1, 2011.
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As this issue is controversial in different legal systems and international
arbitrators widely use the good faith principle because of its subjectivity,3
sandbagging practice cases might be solved in ICA with the application of
the good faith principle, balanced by the binding force of contracts. 4
A.

THiE

SANDBAGGING PRACTICE:

A

CONTROVERSIAL

ISSUE

Given the definition of the sandbagging practice, some practical reasons
made it a controversial issue, which remains sensitive in different legal
systems.
1.

Definition of the Sandbagging Practice

The common definition of sandbagging usually refers to the idea of unfair
treatment and misrepresentation.5 Indeed, this expression comes from the
nineteenth century when robbers used sandbags to knock their victims out in
order to rob them.6 Since the 1940's, this expression is used in poker when a
player acts like he does not have a good hand, when he actually does, in
order to take advantage of his co-players.7 In golf, sandbagging occurs when
a player pretends he is bad when in actuality he is good in order to gain
handicap strokes and increase his chances of winning.8 In procedural law,

the act of sandbagging has different meanings. It can be the act of
voluntarily delaying a procedure, "in order to gain some benefit from the
delay or prejudice to one's opponent."9 It can also mean voluntarily
remaining silent when there is an error at a trial, with the idea of using the
error for appeal if the decision does not meet a party's expectations.Io
Additionally, it defines the actions of a company facing a hostile takeover

&

3. See Munir Maniruzzaman, The Concept of Good Faithin InternationalInvestment Disputes-The
Arbitrator's Dilemma, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Apr. 30, 2012), http://kluwerarbitration
blog.com/2012/04/30/the-concept-of-good-faith-in-intemational-investment-disputes-thearbitrators-dilemma-2/.
4. See Door Janice Wall & Omar Amin, The Implied Duty Of Good Faith In Commercial
Contracts And Its Impact On Deferred Consideration Clauses In Corporate Sale And Purchase
Agreements, LEGAL Bus. WORLD PosTs (May 22, 2017), https://www.legalbusinessworld.nl/
single-post/2017/05/22The-Implied-Duty-Of-Good-Faith-In-Commercial-Contracts-AndIts-Impact-On-Deferred-Consideration-Clauses-In-Corporate-Sale-And-PurchaseAgreements.
5. See Sandbag, MERRIAM-WEBSTER LEARNER'S DIcnONARY (last visited Oct. 5, 2017),
http://www.learnersdictionary.com/definition/sandbag.
6. Glenn D. West & Kim M. Shah, Debunking the Myth of the Sandbagging Buyer: When Sellers
Ask Buyers to Agree to Anti-Sandbagging Clauses, Who is Sandbagging Whom?, 11 MERGERS
AcQuIsrriONs L. 1, 3 (2007).
7. See Aleksandra Miziolek & Dimitrios Angelakos, Sandbagging: From Poker to the World of
Mergers and Acquisitions, 92 MICH. B. J. 6, 30 (2013).
8. Sandbagging, BOUVIER LAW DIcTIONARY (2012).
9. Id.
10. Sandbagging, BIAcK's LAW DicTiONARY (10th ed. 2014).

2018]

SANDBAGGING PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

71

when it pretends to be negotiating for the sole purpose of gaining time to
secure a more favorable offer.11

This article focuses on another definition of sandbagging, regarding the
negotiation and execution of the representation and warranty provisions that
are included in almost all private M&A negotiations.12 In the representation

provisions, the seller communicates to the buyer all information that he
knows, or that he is supposed to know, about the target company.1 3 These
provisions allow both parties to determine the risks of the operation.14 After
closing, in the event of a breach of the representation and warranty
provisions, the buyer can bring an indemnity claim.15 In the latter situation,
the sandbagging practice occurs when the buyer closes a deal despite
knowing that the seller made a false or inaccurate representation, and then
brings a breach of representation claim.16 The buyer performs due diligence
prior to closing and might sometimes be a former executive officer of the
company. 7 If the buyer brings an indemnity claim after closing but had
previous knowledge of the errors of the buyer, we are faced with what can be
called the sandbagging practice.18

2.

The Causes of the Controversy

Several practical reasons explain why this issue is so controversial, and can
be found by studying the buyer's perspective, as well as the seller's
perspective, given the contractual solution is not widely used.
a.

Issues from a Buyer's Perspective

Naturally, buyers tend to be pro-sandbagging.9 Indeed, from the buyer's
perspective, an important concern emerges parallel to extensive due
diligence: if the sandbagging practice is not allowed, the buyer will claim
that the more he knows about the company, the more his warranty will be
inefficient.20 Practitioners' common parlance for this is: "[s]ilence may not
be golden,"21 "[k]nowledge is [n]ot [n]ecessarily [p]ower,"22 or "a little
11. Id.
12. Miziolek & Angelakos, supra note 7, at 30.
13. See Melinda Davis Lux, M&A Indemnification Provisions: Are You Drafting Unenforceable
Time Limits?, 28 S. C. LAW 18, (2017).
14. TIERESE H. MAYNARD, MERGERS AND
PROBLEMS, 319, 943 (Aspen Publishers 2009).

AcQtuSMoNS:

CASES,

MATERIALS,

AND

15. Id. at 320.
16. Id.
17. Management Buyout, CORPORATE FINANCE INSTITUTE, https://corporatefinanceinstitute.

com/resources/knowledge/finance/management-buyout-mbo/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2017) (As it is
the case in a Management Buyout (MBO), for instance.).
18. Luke P. lovine
Sandbagging in M&A Deals: Silence May Not be Golden, 16 M&A LAW 1,
10 (2012).
19. See id.
20. See generally West & Shah, supra note 6.
21. Iovine, supra note 18, at 10.

m,
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knowledge can be a dangerous thing."23 In an anti-sandbagging approach,
because of due diligence, many elements will remain out of the warranty as
the buyer is supposed to know of the breaches represented.24 Due diligence
conducted prior to closing is so thorough that it could be claimed by the
seller that the buyer is supposed to know almost everything.25 In an antisandbagging context, this serves to undermine the representations and
warranties.26 Such a consequence would be unfair for the buyer, especially
because knowing the existence of some misrepresentations does not
necessarily include the knowledge of their impact.27
Permitting the sandbagging practice allows the buyer to isolate a risk
without jeopardizing the entire operation.28 Thus, if a buyer discovers some
elements that will constitute a breach of representations from the seller but
doesn't know yet the potential impact, he can still claim afterward a
compensation based only on the consequences of this misrepresentation.
This compensation is seen as a correction of the price initially paid.
Also, buyers frequently argue that they bought a so-called sandbaggingright with the price of the acquisition.29 The sandbagging-right means the
buyers paid for a right to rely on the information disclosed by the sellers;
thus, they are able to bring an indemnity claim in case of false information.30
This right exists regardless of their own previous knowledge.31 This idea
implies a specific definition to the due diligence, as in such cases these are
not only used for taking the decision to buy and at what price, but also to
determine if there exists some breaches that will allow a post-closing
indemnity claim.32
22. Brandon Cole, Knowledge is Not Necessarily Power: Sandbagging in New York M&A
Transactions 42 IOWAJ. CORP. L. 445.
23. Jonathan Moncrieff, A Little Knowledge Can be a Dangerous Thing: Sandbagging Clauses in
Acquisition Agreements, STIcFIN ELLIOT (Oct. 29, 2012), https://www.stikeman.com/en-ca/

kh/canadian-ma-law/sandbagging-clauses-in-acquisition-agreements-a-little-knowledge-canbe-a-dangerous-thing.
24. DIDIER LECLERCQ, LES CONVENTIONS DE CESSION D'ACTIONS - ANALYSE JURIDIQUE

ET

CONSEILS PRATIQUES DE RPDACTION [SHARE TRANSFER AGREEMENTs - LEGAL ANALYSIS AND
ADVICE WRITING PRACTICES] p.

25. THOMAS METz,

178 (Larcier ed. 2009).

SELLING THE INTANGIBLE COMPANY:

CAPTURE THE VALUE OF A GROWTH FiRm

How To NEGOTIATE AND

201 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2008).

26. See lovine, supra note 18, at 4.
27. ALAIN COURET & PHILIPPE ROSENPICK,

L'ARTICULATION ENTRE DtCLARATIONS ET

[THE ARTICULATION BETWEEN
PASSIF
no175 Droit et Patrimoine [Law and Estate] (2008).
28. West & Shah, supra note 6, at 3: "Rather than being forced to choose between negotiating
a price concession or terminating or attempting to terminate the deal in such circumstances, the
buyer may simply wish to enforce the benefit of the bargain it made by choosing to close the
transaction and seek indemnification based upon the specific, contractual representations and
warranties it negotiated with the seller."
29. See lovine, supra note 18.
30. Id.
3 1. Id.
32. Id.
CLAUSES

DE

GARANTIE

D'ACTIF

REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIEs]

ET

DE
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Another issue frequently raised in favor of the buyer is that the knowledge
of the breach can occur between signing and closing, without letting buyers
cancel the closing. In such anti-sandbagging situations, the seller may
organize the discovering of the breach by the buyer before the closing, but
too late to avoid it, so the buyer won't be able to use this breach for a legal
demand.33
b.

Issues from a Seller's Perspective

Naturally, sellers tend to be anti-sandbagging. Indeed, sellers argue that
in a pro-sandbagging context, all the due diligence made prior to the closing
has the sole objective of finding elements that constitute a breach of seller's
representations.34 These elements would then be used as a basis for a
lawsuit after the closing. Sellers see this practice as particularly unfair, as the
buyer knew of the breaches and could have taken them into account while
negotiating the deal. As a consequence, in a pro-sandbagging context, sellers
believe the extensive due diligence of the buyers' counsel is intrusive and
unfair, as the purpose can be to find breaches in the dispositions in order to
file a post-closing claim.35
Sellers will also argue the sandbagging practice is a denaturalization of the
purpose of due diligence. The original idea of this phase is to inform the
buyer of the current situation of the company.36 In this idea, a seller allows a
potential buyer to engage in due diligence to determine if they are for such a
transaction and at what price.37 If due diligence is used to find breaches in
order to bring a post-closing indemnification claim, the seller will feel
ripped off.
Sellers have become more sensitive about this issue as the buyer's due
diligence investigations grew more extensive over the years.38
3.

"Pro"and "Anti" SandbaggingProvisions

A contractual solution exists by including provisions to solve this
particular point.39 Sellers favor anti-sandbagging provisions stating that the
buyer cannot raise any demand, based on a breach, that he knew of before
the closing.40 Buyers favor pro-sandbagging provisions, also known as
knowledge savings provisions, stating that any previous knowledge of the
breach by the buyer does not constitute a waiver of any potential claim based
on this breach.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
Miziolek & Angelakos, supra note 7, at 31.
Definition and Purposes of Due Diligence-Buyer's Due Diligence, 1 CoRP. CouNs. GD. To
STRATEGIc ALLIANCES § 9:2, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2016).
37. Id.
38. Maynard, supra note 14, at 399.
39. See West & Shah, supra note 6, at 5.
40. See id.
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Despite their efficiency, these provisions are not widely used in M&A
practice.41 The American Bar Association (ABA) collects data yearly on this
issue, showing a significant number of transactions lack sandbagging
provisions.42 In 2014, the latest data available, only 35 percent of the
acquisitions surveyed in the United States included a pro-sandbagging
provision, 9 percent included an anti-sandbagging provision, and 56 percent
remained silent about this question.43 In 2004, the same study showed there
were more sandbagging provisions in acquisitions, but 39 percent remained
silent on this issue at that time.- In Europe during 2014, 24 percent of the
transactions remained silent, 47 percent included an anti-sandbagging
provision, 8 percent included a representation stating the buyer didn't have
any knowledge of a breach by the seller, and only 22 percent included a prosandbagging clause.45 Thus, depending on the regional business culture, the
percentage of inclusion of a pro or anti sandbagging provision in the
acquisition process varies. Nonetheless, this leaves plenty of room for
operations that remain silent on this issue.
The context of the negotiations prior to closing explains why so many
acquisitions remain silent on the sandbagging issue. If the buyer raises the
inclusion of a pro-sandbagging practice clause in the purchase and sale
agreement, the seller will suspect the buyer discovered some
misrepresentation. If the seller has such doubt, he will certainly not accept
any pro-sandbagging provision, but rather try to include an antisandbagging provision to avoid any risk. In consequence, talking about a
pro-sandbagging provision for the buyer might lead to the opposite effect of
what he was looking for.46 Eventually, most of the parties will find it safer to
remain silent on this issue, giving room for the application of the default
state rule.47

4.

A Problem That Remains Sensitive in Different Legal Systems: French
and U.S. Courts

Given these perspectives, the sandbagging act of the buyer is a very
common issue in practice, regardless of the legal system. Taking the
example of state courts in the United States (common law) and French
courts (civil law), different grounds are used depending on the system, but
41. See id.
42. MAA Negotiation Trends: Insightsfrom the 2015 Private Target Deal Points Study, ABA Bus.
LAw SECT. (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business-law/eventscle/in
the know/archive/201603.html.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 2015 European M&A Deal Points Study, ABA Bus. LAW SEC. (Jan. 30, 2016), https://
www.americanbar.org/content/aba/tools/digitalassetabstract.html/content/dam/aba/administra
tive/businessjlaw/deal-points/2015-eustudy.pdf.
46. Leclercq, supra note 24.
47. Stacey A. Shadden, How to Sandbag Your Opponent in the Unsuspecting World of High Stakes

Acquisitions, 47

CREIGHTON

L. R. 459, 475 (2014).
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the same issue remains. The French courts have an evolving approach, but
must balance the contractual good faith and the binding force of contract.48
State courts in the United States diverge in their approaches, considering the
indemnity claim either on a contract or tort basis.49
a.

French Courts: Balance Between Contractual Good Faith and
Binding Force of Contracts

Despite an evolution in favor of the sandbagging practice in 2007, French
jurisprudence compels practitioners to be very careful. Indeed, the
sandbagging behavior of a buyer is mostly seen as contractual bad faith, even
if the binding force of the contract usually prevails.
The French Civil Code provides, as in the majority of civil law systems, a
very widely interpreted principle of contractual good faith. At the beginning
of the nineteenth century, the first version of the French Civil Code, the
Napoleonic Code, include article 1134 al. 3, dedicated to the principle of
bonnefoi-good faith-in contract.50 This article remained unchanged in the
French Civil Code until October 2016 when it was replaced by article
1104.5'

This principle is interpreted broadly, including pre-contractual

good faith,52 which commands the parties to be loyal in the negotiation and
execution of the contract. This interpretation is broader than good faith
applied solely to the execution of the contract. Therefore, in a civil law
system, sandbagging practices can be challenged based on the good faith
principle.
The jurisprudence of the Cour de Cassation, France's highest civil court, on
sandbagging related issues is often hard to interpret.ss For instance, the
Cour de Cassation confirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal, applying
the principle of good faith in the contract to avoid the sandbagging
practice.54 Yet, the very same court in a different case made a very strict
application of the binding force of the warranty and allowed sandbagging.55
48. Solene Rowan, The New French Law of Contract, LSE Rs. ONLINE, (May 2017) http://
eprints.Ise.ac.uk/75815/.
49. See West & Shah, supra note 6, at 3.
50. Code Civil [C. civ.] [Civil Code] art. 1134 (Fr.) ("Les conventions legalement formies
tiennent lieu de loi ceux qui les ont faites. Elles ne peuvent ftre rivoqufes que de leur
consentement mutuel, on pour les causes que la loi autorise. Elles doivent &re ex6cutes de
bonne foi") ["Agreements lawfully entered into take the place of the law for those who have
made them. They may be revoked only by [their] mutual consent, or for causes authorized by
law. They must be performed in good faith."].
51. Code Civil [C. civ.] [Civil Code] art. 1104 (Fr.) ("Les contrats doivent Etre ndgocids,
formis et executes de bonne foi. Cette disposition est d'ordre public") ["Contracts must be
negotiated, trained and executed in good faith. This provision is of public order."].
52. Philippe le Tourneau & Matthieu Poumaride, Bonne foi [Good Faith], RkPERTOIRE DE
DROIT CIVIL [DIRECTORY OF CIVIL LAW] (2017) n. 27.
53. Couret & Rosenpick, supra note 27.
54. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Oct. 11, 2005, Bull.
civ. IV, No. 03-11390 (Fr.).
55. See generally Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Oct. 11,
2005, Bull. civ. 1W, No. 95-15191 (Fr.).

&
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In 2007, the Cour de Cassation eventually ruled that the binding force of
contracts prevailed over the principle of good faith in regard to sandbagging
practice:
If the rule according to which conventions must be performed in good
faith allows the judge to condemn the unfair use of a contractual right,
this doesn't allow him to affect the substance of the rights and
obligations legally agreed between the parties.56
In this decision, the Cour de Cassation put in place a hierarchy between the
principle of good faith and the binding force of contract, in favor of the
latter.s7 It is important to note the question of whether the buyer acted in
good or bad faith does not belong to the Cour de Cassation, who only rules on
the application of the law without qualification of the facts.58 In
consequence, the Cour de Cassationcannot hold the sandbagging practice was
performed in good or bad faith, but can rule on the hierarchy between
binding force of contract and contractual good faith, two principles that are
opposed in the sandbagging cases. 59 The fact that contractual good faith
finally appeared less relevant than the binding force of contract in
sandbagging cases creates a hierarchy of those principles. Consequently, the
sandbagging practice is allowed because of the prevalence of the binding
force of contracts over the good faith principle even when seen as unfair by
the courts.
Although some other decisions followed the 2007 decision, the
uncertainty remained due to the fact that these were factual cases and the
traditional preponderance of the good faith principle.60 Some authors
recommended potential solutions, such as using the good faith principle to
make a difference between knowledge of the breach and knowledge of the
impact of the breach,61 or between knowledge of the breach and knowledge
of the scope of the breach.62 The courts have not yet used these solutions,
56. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Jul. 10, 2007, Bull.
civ. 1V, No. 06-14768 (Fr.) ("[S]i la rigle selon laquelle les conventions doivent &re ex6cuties de
bonne foi permet au juge de sanctionner l'usage diloyal d'une prdrogative contractuelle, elle ne
la substance mbme des droits et obligations 16galement
porter atteinte
l'autorise pas
convenus entre les parties") ["Mf the rule that agreements are to be executed in good faith
permits the judge to sanction the unfair use of a contractual prerogative, it does not authorize it
to infringe the rights and duties legally agreed between the parties."].
57. Xavier Delpech, Le devoir de bonne foi n'icartepas la force obligatoire du contrat [The duty of
good faith does not preclude the binding force of the contract], 2007 D. A. J. 2839.
58. Cour de Cassation, The Role of the Court of Cassation (Jun. 15, 2000), https://www.courdecas
10
sation.fr/IMG/FileThe%20role%20of/`20the%2OCourt%20of%20cassation%2025
2010%2OVersion%20definitive.pdf.
59. Id.
60. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Mar. 15, 2011, Bull.
civ. IV, No. 09-13299 (Fr.); Bruno Dondero, Garantiede passifet bonnefoi [Guaranteeofliabilities
and good faith] REVUE DES SocItTs [COMPANY LAw REvIEw] 334 (2009).
61. Leclercq, supra note 24, at 179.
62. Couret, & Rosenpick, supra note 27.

&
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and extreme caution remains, leading practitioners to be careful with this
issue. 63
b.

U.S. State Courts: On What Should the Buyer Have Relied?

Even if the U.S. legal system also integrated a contractual good faith
principle,- the issue of the sandbagging buyer depends on other legal
grounds.
The historical law of warranty in the United States was mainly in tort, and
evolved into a specific legal framework that some authors qualify as a:
"curious hybrid, born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract."65 Given
these tort grounds, the courts used to consider that the representations in
M&A operations were not part of the contract, so the demands based on
their breaches were actions in tort. 66 Thus, the sandbagging practice was
rejected by the U.S. state courts because of the principle of reliance in tort
actions. In accordance with that principle, the buyer is supposed to have
relied on his own investigations-those that led him to the knowledge of the
breach-rather than the warranty of the seller.67 If the buyer investigates
and knows some representations are not correct, he cannot rely on them, but
he must rely on his own investigation and thus, cannot claim any indemnity
afterwards on the basis of the warranty. In that sense, the buyer waives any
potential claim by closing the deal with the knowledge of the breach.68
Despite the fact the representations are included in the contract, many
courts still rely upon a tort approach.69 This leads to discrepancies on the
question of the necessity of reliance for a demand based on the breach of a
contractual warranty or representation.70
In some states, such as Delaware, a modern rule emerged based on a
contract law approach.7' In this approach, the buyer doesn't only buy the
company, but also buys the warranty. The price paid by the buyer includes
"the cost of a sandbagging right."72 Naturally, this approach leads to prosandbagging decisions.
To understand these discrepancies, we can differentiate two types of
reliance: the reliance in the traditional rule that implies the reliance of the
buyer on its own investigation, in a tort action; and the reliance in the
modern rule that implies the reliance of the buyer on the warranty he
63. Pierre-Menno de Girard & Charles-Audouin Pascaud, Garanties de passif "1134, aline'a
ler" contre "1134, alinea 3": combat de titans ou subtile alliance?, 2009 D. A. J. 2233-37.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§

205 (1981); U.C.C.

§

2-103.

65. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 651 (3d ed. 1964).
66. West & Shah, supra note 26, at 4.
67. See e.g., Assocs. of San Lazaro v. San Lazaro Park Properties, 864 P.2d 111, 115 (Colo.
1993).
68. Whitehead, supra note 1, at 1084.
69. West & Shah, supra note 6, at 5.
70. Id. at 4-5.
71. Whitehead, supra note 1, at 1081.
72. Id. at 1085.

78

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 5 1, NO. I

purchased, in a contract-based action.73 In other words, the "buyer's
reliance on the truthfulness of a seller's warranty," versus the "reliance on a
promise necessary for the formation of a warranty."74
It is important to note that the majority of the M&A transactions in the
United States elect New York and Delaware laws.7s Even though Delaware
courts have a clear pro-sandbagging approach, New York courts have a more
complex system, adopting a contractual approach that does not necessarily
lead to pro-sandbagging solutions. In CBS Inc. v. Zif Davis Publishing Co.,
the court adopted a contract approach and accepted the sandbagging
practice, but only because the deal was closed, and the court made clear the
buyer did not waive its claim regarding the specific breach.76 The reason for
this is because the buyer mentioned the breach to the seller before closing
the deal, but the buyer denied it.77 In subsequent cases based on New York
law, such as Galli v. Metz, the court rejected sandbagging practices even
while adopting a contractual approach:
Where a buyer closes on a contract in the full knowledge and
acceptance of facts disclosed by the seller which would constitute a
breach of warranty under the terms of the contract, the buyer should be
foreclosed from later asserting the breach. In that situation, unless the
buyer expressly preserves his rights under the warranties (as CBS did in
Ziff-Davis), we think the buyer has waived the breach.78
Thus, the court considered that the buyer waived its claim when he had
knowledge of the breach before closing.79
In other decisions, courts applying New York law considered questions
such as the origin of the knowledge of the buyer and the effects of the
common knowledge.s0 Eventually, if the knowledge of the breach comes
from an explicit disclosure of the seller, the buyer has waived its claim81
The New York case law, thus, implies a specific system in that the origin of
73. Matthew

J.

Duchemin, Whether Reliance on the Warranty is Required in a Common Law

Action for Breach of an Express Warranty, 82 MARQ. L. REv. 689, 707 (1999).
74. Id. at 689.
75. John C. Coates, Managing Dispute Through Contract: Evidence from M&A, 2 HARV. Bus. L.
REv. 295, 322 (2012); see also lovine, supra note 21, at 10.
76. CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publ'g Co., 75 N.Y.2d 496, 503, 506 (1990).
77. Id. at 500-01.
78. Galli v. Metz, 973 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 1992).
79. Iovine, supra note 18, at 10 ("If the seller affirmatively discloses the existence of the breach
(as opposed to the buyer discovering the breach itself or through a third party) then the premise
that the buyer believed it was purchasing the seller's promise as to the truth of the
representations is not as solid and the buyer may not be permitted to recover for that breach if
the buyer elects to close anyway.").
80. See Rogath v. Siebenmann, 129 F.3d 261, 264-66 (2d Cir. 1997).
81. Frederick R. Fucci, Arbitration in M&A Transactions: Laws of New York and Delaware, Part
I, 71 DIsP. RESOL. J., 1, 16-17 (2016).
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the buyer's knowledge, as well as the communication of such knowledge to
the seller, play a major role.82
Courts are divided on this controversial issue, between states that adopt
the modem rule, and states that apply the traditional rule83 Furthermore,
the reasoning and law principles that lead a specific jurisdiction to accept
sandbagging are not always the same. 84 Some states, such as Delaware,
adopt a contractual approach that leads to pro-sandbagging solutions, but
New York adopts a contractual approach that does not automatically lead to
pro-sandbagging decisions.85 In consequence, the sandbagging judgment by
the courts are not easily predictable in function of the state default rule.86
The decision will depend on the jurisdictions that have had the opportunity
to consider this issue.87 These discrepancies reflect the controversial aspect
of this issue. Accordingly, practitioners should remain cautious.

II. The Particularity of the Good Faith Principle in ICA
In M&A, representation and warranty provisions typically include an
arbitration clause. This makes ICA the preferred dispute resolution
method.88 Yet, precedents of national courts are not binding for
international arbitrators, they massively use the contractual good faith
principle, which has a different meaning for international arbitration cases as
if it was used before national courts.

A.

STARE DECISIs

FROM

NATIONAL COURTS AND

ICA

Judges from different legal systems apply different legal grounds, such as
the good faith principle, to sandbagging practice cases. The question left to
determine is whether, in a case of the application of a national law that
includes the principle of good faith, but whose national courts never used it
in the appreciation of the sandbagging practice, the international arbitrators
may use it or not. In more generic terms, this is the common question of
"whether [the arbitrators] should follow the case law of domestic courts of
the jurisdiction whose law applies to the contract before them."89 We are
not talking about the common debate of binding precedent between arbitral
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Whitehead, supra note 1, at 1084-85.
Miziolek & Angelakos, supra note 7, at 31-34.
Id.

86. Iovine, supra note 18, at 10 ("Even though this so-called 'pro-sandbagging' default rule in
Delaware and New York may mean that a majority of buyers will have some right to sandbag,
even if an acquisition agreement is silent on the issue, buyers should be aware that sandbagging
case law has only recently started to evolve and these default rules continue to have some
ambiguities.").
87. Duchemin, supra note 72, at 689.
88. Gessel Kalinowska vel Kalisz, supra note 2, at 32.
89. Klaus Peter Berger, To What Extent Should Arbitrators Respect Domestic Case Law? The

German Experience Regarding The Law On StandardTerms, 32 ARa. Iwr'L 243, 243 (2016).
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awards. Instead, we are talking about determining whether international
arbitrators should take into account the case law of the national courts
applying the applicable law.
The role of precedents is one of the main differences between the
construction and use of the two legal systems studied here: common law and
civil law. If common law incorporates a strong binding precedent principle
that applies to its courts, civil law countries usually do not include such
principle.90 In civil law countries, precedents from higher courts usually play
an important role in the interpretation of the law because lower courts try to
respect such interpretation in order to avoid having decisions undermined.91
However, international arbitral tribunals are created on a case-by-case basis,
and produce only one award regarding the case for which they are created.92
They do not have any previous decisions and thus, cannot have any concern
regarding the inconsistency or consistency of their award with their previous
one. 9 3 Additionally, the award taken by an international arbitral tribunal is
not supposed to be subject to review by national courts. 94 In consequence,
such tribunals should not be concerned, as domestic judges are, by the risk of
having their award reversed by a higher court. 95 Furthermore, the awards
remain generally confidential and unpublished in such a way that should
prevent the creation of any case law in ICA.96 Finally, one of the reasons for
choosing ICA to resolve disputes can be to have an application of the law
adapted to fit the needs of international business-a feature that doesn't
belong to the domestic courts-while also allowing the international
arbitrators to disengage from national case law.97
In consequence, even if international arbitrators frequently used court
precedents, like U.S. judges,98 case law is not binding, and the arbitrators are
not compelled to follow domestic decisions if the situation requires a
different solution.

B.

THE SPECIFICITY OF THE CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH
PRINCIPLE IN

ICA

The principle of contractual good faith, that might apply to sandbagging
cases, as shown by the precedent developments, is very specific in ICA. It
90. Id. at 250.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 253.
93. Id. at 252.
94. Id.
95. Id. ("[A]rbitrators-unlike judges-are appointed for the resolution of only a single
dispute and issue final decisions that are not subject to appeal, i.e. a 'r6vision au fond' of their
rulings by the competent domestic courts in setting aside proceedings at the seat of the
arbitration is not permissible.").
96. Id. ("In addition, their awards are usually not published and they, therefore, need not and
cannot be concerned with the consistency of their decisions with other awards.").
97. See id. at 252-57.
98. Id. at 252.
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became a major concept of international law widely used by international
arbitrators, and is very flexible when used in ICA.

1.

ContractualGood Faith: A Major Concept of InternationalLaw

Due to the development of international treaties and international trade,
the principle of contractual good faith is now recognized as a fundamental
principle in international law.99 The Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties introduced the general principle of good faith regarding
performance of treaties in 1969.100 The United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods included the contractual good
faith principle in 1980.101 The International Court of Justice also referred to
the contractual good faith in some of its decisions.102 Regarding
international trade, contractual good faith was included in the UNIDROIT
Principles in article 1.7, which provides:
Art. 1.7: (Good Faith and Fair Dealing)
(1) Each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing
in international trade.
(2) The parties may not exclude or limit this duty.103
This inclusion in the UNIDROIT Principles reflects unanimous
recognition of contractual good faith at an international trade level.

2.

ContractualGood Faith: Widely Used by the InternationalArbitrators

The wide use of the principle of good faith by international arbitrators is
well-known.104 This principle is so frequently used in ICA that the parties
cannot pretend to avoid it.105 International arbitrators refer to the good faith
99. Bernardo M. Cremades, Good Faith in InternationalArbitration, 27 AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
761, 780-81 (2012).
100. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
("Noting that the principles of free consent and of good faith and the pacta sunt servanda rule

are universally recognized . . ."); see also Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. U.K., 2003-06 PCA
Case Repository, Partial Award, 1, 25 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007) (noting that the parties agreed to
use the Vienna Convention of the law of treaties as a guide to the interpretation of both the
treaty and the international contract).
101. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art.

7(1),1980, 10 U.S.T. 56997 ("In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the
observance of good faith in international trade.").
102. Cremades, supra note 99, at 780.

103. International Institute for the Unification of Priv. Law [UNIDROIT], Principles of
InternationalCommercial Contracts, art. 1.7 (2010), http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/

contracts/principles20l0/integralversionprinciples2010-e.pdf.
104. Pierre Mayer, Le Principe de Bonne foi devant les Arbitres du Commerce International,
FEsrscsHur

PIERRE LALIvE, BASEL, FRANKFURT, 543, 543 (1993).

105. C6line Cros, La bonne foi est un principe gintral du commerce internationalque les parties ne
peuvent ni exclure ni modifier, LE MONDE Du DROrr (Dec. 14, 2000), http://
www.lemondedudroit.fr/affaires-internationales-international/146812.html.
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principle via the application of a national law or via the application of the
principles of international law.1o6 They can also apply it despite the
requirements of the applicable national law.107 UNIDROIT Principles are
part of the lex mercatoria that is used as legal basis by international
arbitrators,os and as seen above, include a good faith principle.109 In fact,
these principles usually imply material rules of the lex mercatoria, and the
principle of good faith is the most used UJNIDROIT principle to create
some material rules. Indeed, as Pierre Mayer mentions, around half of the
lex mercatoriaprinciples pointed out by Lord Mustillsio can be directly linked
to the principle of good faith. Therefore, the principle of good faith appears
to be "the principle of the principles.""n In this sense, the principle of good
faith serves as the basis for other rules and even other general principles,
thus, becoming "one of the richest sources of lex mercatoria."112 Eventually,
the good faith principle became a rule used as a basis for an international
arbitration demand, starting with the Norsolor case.113
3.

Contractual Good Faith:A Flexible Principle When Used in ICA

The notion of good faith and its use as a principle can vary depending on
the legal system where it is applied, and whether it is applied in either a
national or international context. This is true even inside the same legal
system." 4
106. Mayer, supra note 104, at 548.
107. See also JOSHUA KARTON, THE CULTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND THE
EvOLUTION OF CONTRAcT LAw 94 (6th ed., 2013) ("Another aspect of arbitral lawlessness is
arbitrator's reliance on "good faith" as a purported general principle of international
commercial law, even when applying the substantive law of a country that contains no general
requirement of good faith."); Larry A. Di Matteo, The CISG and the Presumption of Enforceability:
Unintended ContractualLiability in InternationalBusiness Dealings, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 111, 145
(1997).
108. Karton, supra note 107, at 141 ("When transnational law is invoked, tribunals almost
invariably point to a codified instrument, such as the UNIDROIT Principles, CISG,
INCOTERMS, or UCP 600. Codified instruments appeal to international arbitrators because
they represent an international consensus. More importantly, they are predictable, and
therefore, palatable to commercial parties, which crave certainty.").
109. UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 103.
110. Michael Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria:The First Twenty-Five Years, 4 ARB. INT'L 86, 86119 (1988).
111. Mayer, supra note 104, at 554 ("[E]nviron la moiti6 des vingt principes de lalex mercatoria
citns par LORD MIUSTELL dans son article aux M6langes Wilberforce ont 6t6 express6ment
rattach6s au principe supdrieur de la bonne foi, qui apparait ainsi comme le principe des
principes.").
112. EMMANUEL GAILLARD, FoucHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 820 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999).

113. Cremades, supra note 99, at 783.
114. Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga, Good Faith, Bad Faith, But Not Losing Faith:A Commentay on the
2010 IBA Rules on the Taking ofEvidence in InternationalArbitration,43 GEO. J. INT'L L. 387, 412
(2012) ("At the very outset, the concept of good faith is contingent upon the legal tradition,
culture, and system in which it appears. The challenge in interpreting the concept of good faith
goes far beyond even the fundamental civil/common law divide because even within the

2018]

SANDBAGGING PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

83

These changes are a consequence of the subjectivity of the good faith
principle, which has to be interpreted in the context of the case. Indeed, the
perception of good faith itself necessarily implies subjectivism, and
therefore, uncertainty.115 Thus, at an international level-particularly in
international commercial arbitration where each arbitral award is
independent from the others excluding any doctrine of precedent or stare
decisis-the subjectivism of the good faith principle comes into play.I6
This subjectivism of the good faith principle is also an explanation of its
success in ICA, and its worthwhile elasticity.17 Pierre Mayer explained the
reasons for such usage that come from this subjectivism. According to him,
the good faith principle is used by the arbitrators as a way for them to add
equity in their decisions.s Yet, only the subjectivity of this principle,
especially when put in relation to the context of the case, allows arbitrators
to add some equity in a law-based decision. Thus, arbitrators may use the
good faith principle to adapt the application of the law to the equity required
by the international practice, giving this principle a more dynamic role,
"unknown (or unseen) in the law."119 Some awards have stated in this sense,

using the principle of good faith to challenge the strict application of other
legal rules.120

The purpose of ICA in itself explains the use of a flexible good faith
principle by international arbitrators. As already stated by Philippe
Fouchard in 1965, the interest of international arbitration is to find
satisfactory outcomes for international litigation cases according to rules that
belong to international trade, and to apply rules that are more adapted than
the national laws.121 Thus, ICA became the main way to determine and
apply international business law, and one of its virtues is its capacity to
provide laws adapted to fit the needs of international trade.122 Also, as
framework of civil law jurisdictions, different meanings of good faith are recurring and readily
discernible.").
115. JACQUES FLOUR ET. AL, LES OBLIGATIONS, 1. L'ACTE JURIDIQUE, 402 (Dalloz eds. 2014)
("La notion mbme de bonne foi est entach6e d'une irreductible incertitude et d'un
incompressible subjectivisme").
116. Pierre Mayer, The Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in ICC Arbitration Practice, ICC
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN, 105, 111 (Emmanuel Jolivet ed., 2002).
117. Ejan Mackaay et al., L'economie de la bonnefoi contractuelle, 422, 433 (2003) ("I'dlasticit6
louable' du principe") ["the laudable elasticity of the principle"].
118. Mayer, supra note 104, at 543.
119. Id. "La seconde cause est propre a la place que tient la bonne foi dans la lex mercatoria.
Celle ci ne se borne pas a recevoir en son sein les solutions consacr6es par les droits 6tatiques;
elle donne au principe de bonne foi un r6le plus dynamique, inconnu (ou invisible) dans le
droit" [The second cause is peculiar to the place of good faith in the lex mercatoria. This is not
limited to receiving within itself the solutions consecrated by state rights; it gives the principle
of good faith a more dynamic role, unknown (or invisible) in law.].
120. See Award in ICC case no. 4761, Clunet 1012, 1015, 1017 (1987); ICC case no. 6129, 1047
(1990); Isabelle Barribre Brousse, Efficaciti du contrat et arbitrage commercial international,
L'efficacit6 du contrat, Dalloz, 2011, at 84; Mayer, supra note 104, at 543.
121. PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, L'ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL (Dalloz, 1965).
122. ERIc LoQUIN, L'ARBITRAGE DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL (Joly eds. 2015).
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briefly explained in the introduction, one of the main reasons for the choice
of international arbitration as a litigation resolution is that it will usually
reflect international practices. Indeed, the simple choice of international
arbitration frequently implies the will of the parties to have a decision
adapted to the current practices of the international trade. In a more general
sense, international commercial arbitration prevents legal uncertainty in
international operations. National rules do not always fit the needs of
international transactions, so international arbitrators have elaborated
transnational material rules, inspired by their national system, international
conventions, or practices in international trade.123 To reach such
adaptability, a flexible good faith principle is an efficient tool for
international arbitrators.

m.

Consequences Regarding the Sandbagging Practice in ICA

Given the use and specificities of the good faith principle before
international arbitrators, it is more likely to be applied to reject sandbagging
practice in ICA; however, the pacta sunt servanda principle still remains a
major basis of international trade. Finally, international practice and needs
could involve less bad faith qualification for sandbagging buyers' acts.

A.

CowrRACTUAL
CASES IN

GOOD FATH

USED TO REJECT SANDBAGGING

ICA

Given the uncertainty that remains regarding sandbagging practice in the
national systems, international arbitrators can easily use the good faith
principle to match the rule of law with the expected behavior, in good faith
of the parties in sandbagging cases. This is more likely to occur when
arbitrators think the behavior of the sandbagging buyer is unfair, and
therefore, want to reject his claim. Indeed, they would prefer the binding
force of contract-pactasunt servanda principle-if they want to decide that a
sandbagging claim is fair.

B.

THEi

PREVALENCE OF THE PACTA SUNT SERVANDA PRINCIPLE

One of the most recognized principles in international contract law is the
binding force of the contract-pacta sunt servanda principle. As already
mentioned, the good faith principle is frequently linked to the pacta sunt
servanda principle when highlighting their importance and unanimous
recognition among the legal systems.1 24 In fact, the good faith principle is
frequently perceived as linked to the pacta sunt servanda principle in order to
determine what a party shall expect in the execution of the contract in good
faith from the other party.1 25 We can note regarding international
123. Barribre Brousse, supra note 120, at 84.
124. Emmanuel Gaillard, Trente ans de Lex MercatoriaPour une applicationsilective de la mithode
des principes gintraux du droit, 1 J. Du DROrT INT'L 5, 7 (1995).
125. Id.
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conventions, the good faith principle is inserted inside the article relating to
the pacta sunt servanda principle in the Vienna Convention: "Every treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in
good faith."126 The statements of the parties of this Convention, already
mentioned, also link these two principles: "Noting that the principles of free
consent and of good faith and the pacta sunt servanda rule are universally
recognized."27 This principle is also present in the UJNIDROIT Principles:
"A contract validly entered into is binding upon the parties. It can only be
modified or terminated in accordance with its terms or by agreement or as
otherwise provided in these Principles."128
Thus, even when deciding that the behavior of the sandbagging buyer
qualifies as contractual bad faith, arbitrators will always have to balance the
good faith principle with the binding force of the contract. They might
decide, in function of the cases, that the binding force of the contract
prevails over the principle of good faith, as did the French Cour de Cassation
in its 2007 decision.129
Not surprisingly, the available awards show that international arbitration
usually favors the application of the contract,1 30 even if it is sometimes
challenged by the good faith principle in order to maintain a certain balance
between the obligations of the parties.131

C.

EVOLUTION OF THE PRACTICE: SANDBAGGING

COULD BE MORE

AND MORE GOOD FAITH

In the ICA context, and today, the sandbagging behavior of a buyer will
not necessarily be considered bad faith. Indeed, as stated above, a
consequence of the subjective notion of good faith in ICA is to allow the
international arbitrator the ability to adapt his decision to the international
practice. Yet, some courts allow sandbagging because of the binding force of
contracts (regardless of its good or bad faith qualification).132 Once legally
admitted, this practice will be regarded as less and less unfair. In
consequence, the application of the contractual good faith principle can also
lead to pro-sandbagging repercussions in ICA, as the sandbagging action of
the buyer might be seen as less and less unfair in practice.

IV. Conclusion
Two main concluding observations can be inferred from the above. First,
the wide use of the good faith principle by the international arbitrators, and
its application regardless of the will of the parties or the applicable law, make
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 100, at art. 26.
Id. at 323.
UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 103, at art. 1.3.
Cour de cassation [Cass.], supra note 56.
Brousse, supra note 120; see also Award in ICC case No 3327, Clunet 971 (1982).
See Brousse, supra note 120.
Cour de cassation [Cass.], supra note 56.
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its consideration inevitable in a sandbagging practice case, especially given
the controversial nature of this issue. Second, because of the evolution of
the international practice and the pacta sunt servanda principle, the
application of the good faith principle in ICA does not necessarily imply a
sanction of the sandbagging practice. Still, practitioners should keep in
mind that the consideration of the good faith principle might occur in
sandbagging cases before international arbitrators, and should therefore take
it into account in their strategy when counseling a client.133

133. Cremades, supranote 99, at 766 ("For those who set the parties' strategy when a case arises
in which good faith may play a material role, the major question to ask is whether or not the
legal culture and training of the potential arbitrators might condition their ultimate decision.
Counsel must be aware of the various angles that can be given to good faith in legal argument,
as well as in the arbitrators' decision-making process.").

